Low take-up of benefits among eligible individuals plagues public programs. This paper examines the impact of laws mandating improved information sharing on benefit recipiency. We study employer notice laws, which require employers to provide employees with information about unemployment insurance at the time of separation. Using cross-sectional and panel data, we find that individuals residing in states with notice laws have about 9 percentage point higher rates of applying for and receiving unemployment insurance benefits, and are 6 to 10 percentage points less likely to cite lack of information about eligibility or the application process as reasons for not applying. By leveraging variation in the timing of notice law adoption—driven by policy changes in Massachusetts in the 1990s and nationwide during the Covid-19 period—we find that adoption of notice laws increased recipiency rates by similar magnitudes.
Working Papers
“Occupational Job Ladders Within and Between Firms” (2022 update)
Abstract:
I present four facts about occupational mobility: (1) most movements occur within fi rms, (2) downward moves are frequent, (3) wage growth reflects the direction and distance of mobility, and (4) relative occupational wages before mobility predict the direction of mobility, except for non-displaced movers between fi rms. I show these facts are consistent with models of vertical sorting. I show that non-displaced movements between fi rms obscure the positive selection of upward occupational movers, likely reflecting moves up a firm-wage job ladder. Displaced workers show similar pre-displacement selection to internal movers, with pre-displacement occupational wage rank predicting the direction of occupational mobility.